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IS THERE AN ACCUSER IN THE HOUSE?:
EVALUATING STATEMENTS MADE TO PHYSICIANS
AND OTHER MEDICAL PERSONNEL IN THE WAKE OF
CRA WFORD V. WASHINGTON AND
DAVIS V. WASHINGTON
DAVE GORDON*
What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the
treatmentin regardto the life ofmen, which on no accountone must spreadabroad,
I will keep to myself holding such things shameful to be spoken about.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Most people do not associate medical caregivers with court rooms and criminal
prosecutions. We visit doctors and nurses when we are sick with the hope that they
will make us feel well. But doctors and nurses may take on an entirely different role
relatively recent United3
when providing treatment to victims of violent crimes. The
2
Davisv. Washington
and
Washington
v.
Crawford
decisions
Court
States Supreme
jurisprudence. In
Clause
have fundamentally altered long-standing Confrontation

turn, this change has affected the role of medical caregivers who treat victims of
physical abuse. Through their patients' statements, some doctors who report patient
abuse have become suppliers of evidence against criminal defendants. 4 With the
Supreme Court's new approach to the Sixth Amendment, that role has had a
significant impact on the constitutional right of criminal defendants to confront their

accusers.
In the year following Crawfordapproximately 1.7 million victims of physical
assault visited emergency hospital departments.5 Presumably, each visit involved
questions about the nature and source of the victim's injury. In many cases
physicians and medical personnel were required to report the abuse to law
enforcement. 6 Were these medical caregivers aware that their questions could
subsequently implicate the federally-protected confrontation right of the alleged
attackers?

* J.D. candidate 2009. I would like to thank Robert Sanchez, Maya Anderson, and Reed Easterwood for
their insightful editorial contributions to this article. Thanks are also due to Professor David C. Witherington for
his willingness to discuss this project and thoughtful research advice. Lastly, I would like to thank Professor
Norman Bay for his invaluable guidance in this effort.
1. HIPPOCRATES, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH (Ludwig Edelstein trans., 1943), available at
http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/nova/doctors/oathclassical.html.
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
4. It is important to acknowledge that the American Medical Association mandates reporting procedures
for physicians who suspect patient abuse. AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICALETHICS § 2.02 (2002). Physicians
are also obliged to testify in court whenever necessary to "assist in the administration of justice." Id. § 9.07.
Additionally, every state has a mandatory reporting law for physicians who reasonably suspect child abuse. ALBERT
R. JONSEN ET AL., CLINIcAL ETHICs: APRACICAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISIONS INCLINICAL MEDICINE, 202
(2006). For New Mexico's reporting law see NMSA1978, § 32A-4-3 (2005).
5. ERIC W. NAWAR Er AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL HOSPITAL
AMBULATORY MEDICAL CARE SURVEY: 2005 EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT SUMMARY 22 (2007), available at

http://www.cdc.gov/nchsldataladlad386.pdf.
6. See JONSEN, supranote 4, at 202.
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This article will explore the effect Crawfordand Davis have had on out-of-court
statements made to medical personnel and consider the future repercussions those
decisions will have on providers of emergency medicine. Part II of this article will
give a historical overview of the Confrontation Clause and its development through
the 20th century. It will also provide a brief synopsis of Crawford and Davis and
note some of the initial questions those decisions present in the area of medical
communications. Part ImI will present the divergent analyses that state and federal
courts have adopted in applying the Confrontation Clause to statements made to
physicians. This section will pay particular attention to the different approaches
courts have taken when addressing statements made by adults compared with
statements made by children and how that distinction relates to human cognitive
development. Lastly, Part IV of this article will evaluate recent developments in
New Mexico law concerning the Confrontation Clause and statements made to
medical personnel. This section will then argue for a uniform confrontation analysis
that upholds the core concepts and values of Crawfordand Davis.
II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE BACKGROUND
A. ConfrontationOriginsto Ohio v. Roberts
The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution provides that in
criminal cases the accused has "the right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him."7 Jurists have noted that the precise origins of the Confrontation Clause are
indefinite.8 However, most scholars agree that the clause was derived from an
English common law right that was brought to the forefront during the injustices of
the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603. 9 In light of the limited historical record of
the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has continuously sought to discern the
extent of protection the clause provides to criminal defendants. While the most
expansive reading of the clause would likely bar all hearsay statements in criminal
prosecutions,' 0 even the earliest decision interpreting the clause notes that such a
broad reading of the Amendment would be unworkable."
The Confrontation Clause was designed to prevent the civil law mode of
prosecution whereby depositions or ex parte affidavits were used against criminal
defendants in place of live testimony by accusatory witnesses. 2 To that end, the
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that there are exceptions to the bar

7. U.S. CONST.amend. VI.
8. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) ("History seems to give us very little insight into the
intended scope of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.") (Harlan, J., concurring); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1015 (1988) ("The Sixth Amendment... traces back to the beginnings of Western legal culture.").
9. E.g., FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A
STUDY IN CONsTrTUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 104 (1951); see also Kenneth W. Graham Jr., The Right of
Confrontationandthe Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter RaleighLoses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL.99,99-101 (1972)
(providing a concise account of the Raleigh trial).
10. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 521 (2002).

11. Commenting on the notion that the Sixth Amendment along with certain other constitutional protections
cannot be read as absolute, Justice Brown remarked, "The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public
shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused." Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
12. Id.
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against out-of-court statements used to incriminate where strict adherence to the text
of the Sixth Amendment will be "carried farther than is necessary to the just
protection of the accused, and farther than the safety of the public will warrant."' 3
For the greater part of the last three decades the exceptions to the Confrontation
Clause have been tethered to a demonstration of trustworthiness. In 1980 the
Supreme Court decided Ohio v. Roberts 4 which set out the controlling
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause as it applied to hearsay for the
subsequent twenty-four years. In Roberts, the Court held that where adverse hearsay
witnesses were not available for testimony, their out-of-court statements could be
admitted into evidence "only if [they bore] adequate indicia of reliability."' 5
Establishing reliability could be inferred where the statements (1) fell within a
"firmly rooted hearsay exception" or (2) demonstrated "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness."' 6 In the years following Roberts, lower courts developed a host
of factors used to determine when a given out-of-court statement showed
particularized guarantees of reliability. 17
The relatively straightforward Roberts analysis created an efficient solution to
the tension between the confrontation right and hearsay.' 8 However, by the end of
the twentieth century the Supreme Court began to recognize that the test did not
fully accomplish the goals of the Sixth Amendment.' 9
B. A New ConfrontationStandard:Crawford v. Washington
In 2004 the Supreme Court decided Crawfordv. Washington20 and overruled the
reliability test set out in Roberts and its progeny. Writing for a majority of seven,
Justice Scalia delivered a decision that drastically altered the Confrontation Clause
landscape. Defendant Michael Crawford appealed a Washington Supreme Court
conviction for assault and attempted murder. 2 Michael was charged after stabbing

13. Id.
14. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).

15. Id. at 66 (internal quotations omitted).
16. Id.
17. Under the Roberts regime, New Mexico courts looked to four factors in finding particularized indicia
of reliability: "(1) ambiguity; (2) lack of candor; (3) faulty memory; and (4) misperception." State v. Ross, 122

N.M. 15, 24, 919 P.2d 1080, 1089 (1996). Other jurisdictions looked to additional factors in making reliability
determinations. The litigation that led to the eventual overturning of Roberts was partly based on a Washington

appeals court decision noting a nine-factor analysis for reliability. Those factors were (1) motive to fabricate, (2)
general character of the statement, (3) number of people who heard the statement, (4) spontaneity of the statement,
(5) timing of the statement, (6) existence of express assertions of past facts, (7) whether cross-examination would
show lack of knowledge, (8) the possibility of false recollection, and (9) the circumstances surrounding the
statement. Washington v. Crawford, 107 Wash. App. 1025 (2001), rev'd Washington v. Crawford 541 U.S. 36

(2004).
18. John G. Douglas, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1797, 1819 (2001).

19. See Ully v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999). Concurring in the opinion, Justice Breyer expressed his
readiness to move beyond the reliability test set out in Roberts, noting that the test was both too narrow and too
broad. He explained that the Roberts test was too narrow in that it "authorize[d] the admission of out-of-court

statements prepared as testimony for a trial when such statements happen[ed] to fall within some well-recognized
hearsay rule exception." At the same time was overbroad because it could "make a constitutional issue out of the
admission of any relevant hearsay statement, even if that hearsay statement is only tangentially related to the

elements in dispute...." Id. at 141-42 (Breyer, J., concurring).
20. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
21. Id. at41.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

a man who allegedly attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia.22 As part of the State's
evidence, prosecutors introduced a taped statement by Sylvia, which provided her
account of the stabbing.23 The recording was created during a police interview and
was introduced at trial to show that Michael had not acted in self-defense.24 Sylvia
did not testify at her husband's trial because of the State's marital privilege;
however, the trial court allowed the statement because it fell into the hearsay
exception of statements against penal interest.25 Using a nine-factor test to establish
a lack of sufficient reliability, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court determination that admitted the recording.26 Ultimately, the Washington
Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and allowed the statement finding
sufficient reliability because it was "virtually identical" to statements that Michael
made to police. 7 Michael appealed the conviction to the U.S. Supreme Court
claiming that admission of the tape violated the Confrontation Clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Washington high court's decision and
explicitly abandoned the reliability approach outlined in Roberts.28 Justice Scalia
harshly criticized the Roberts analysis as a "malleable standard"29 and noted that
"[w]hether a statement is deemed reliable depends heavily on which factors the
judge considers and how much weight he accords each of them., 30 Dissatisfied with
the potential for arbitrary decision-making under Roberts,3' the Court articulated a
new approach to determine the scope of the Confrontation Clause. The Court held
that where testimonial statements were at issue, the Constitution requires that the
witness be unavailable and the defendant have a prior opportunity to crossexamine. 32 As a basis for establishing testimonial statements, Justice Scalia referred
to a definition of "testimony" as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact. ,33 Beyond the definition of testimony,
the Court only gave clues pointing toward the meaning of testimonial.
Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of Crawfordis its overall lack of guidance.
At the same time the Court announced the groundbreaking approach to the

22. Id. at 38.
23. Id.
24.

Id.

25. Id. Washington's marital privilege provides, in part, "[a] husband shall not be examined for or against
his wife, without the consent of the wife, nor a wife for or against her husband without the consent of the husband."
WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060 (1995).
26. Crawford, 541 U.S. at41.

27. Id. This line of reasoning is also referred to as the "interlocking" approach. The theory is that statements
inhere a presumption of reliability if they match or are substantially similar to statements made by another. See Lee
v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986).
28.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.

29. Id. at 60.
30. Id. at 63. Echoing Justice Breyer's concurrence in Lilly, Justice Scalia further attacked the Roberts
analysis by declaring that the "unpardonable vice of the Roberts test.. is... its demonstrated capacity to admit core

testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude." Id.
31. Id. at 65.
32. Id. at 68.
33. Id. at 51 (citing N. WEBSTER, AN AMER1CAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Ist ed. 1828)).
Justice Scalia has received sharp criticism for selecting this definition of "testimonial" as it was the last of five
available definitions of testimony taken from a dictionary published nearly thirty years after the ratification of the
Sixth Amendment. Randolph N. Jonakait, "Witnesses" in the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington,
Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 159 (2006).

Summer 2008]

DOC TALK

Confrontation Clause, it failed to give specific criteria for distinguishing testimonial
and nontestimonial statements.' The Court emphasized that the Confrontation
Clause was adopted to prevent the abusive practices of English justices of the
peace.35 In line with that aim, Justice Scalia indicated three examples of testimonial
statements:
[1] exparte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was
unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, [2] extrajudicial statements...
contained in formalized testimonial materials such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions, and [3] statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial.36
Under this new approach to the Confrontation Clause, the Court found that

Syliva' s recorded statement was testimonial and its admission therefore unconstitu-

tional.37 While many saw Crawfordas a reification of the confrontation right,38 one
member of the Court believed that the decision simply "cast[] a mantle of
uncertainty over future criminal trials in both federal and state courts., 39 In a
separate opinion, Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court's refusal to define

34. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Chief Justice Rehnquist found the Court's silence particularly troubling given
the constant stream of criminal cases in United States courts. He explained that
the thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors need answers
as to what beyond the specific kinds of "testimony" the Court lists is covered by the new rule.
They need them now, not months or years from now. Rules of criminal evidence are applied
every day in courts throughout the country, and parties should not be left in the dark in this
manner.
Id. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
35. Id. at 43-44. Justices of the peace in Marian England were typically "leading local gentry, appointed
by royal commission for each county" who were granted the judicial power to investigate criminal violations. JOHN
H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTiNG CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE 5 (1974). Operating
under the bail and committal statutes, these justices were empowered to interrogate accused felons and their
accusers before trial and prepare memoranda that were used for subsequent prosecution. Id. at 16. Because of the
relatively crude drafting of the committal statute, justices of the peace were given broad leeway to record evidence
of the defendant's alleged crime. Id. at 18. Although the primary function of the bail and committal statutes was
not to create written evidence for trial, the memoranda of the justices of the peace began to be used in place of live
testimony by the examination witnesses. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48.
36. Id. at 51-52. Interestingly, the Court announced that dying declarations, even if testimonial, would likely
be admissible even under the new constraints of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 56 n.6. The Court explained that
dying declarations represented a unique hearsay exception that should remain exempt from Confrontation Clause
review. Id. Citing Mattox, Scalia noted that the dying declaration exception has enjoyed a long history in American
law. Id. The exception appears to be largely based on inherent guarantees of reliability. See 5 JOHN H. WIGMoRE,
EvIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1438, at 289 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) ("All courts have agreed, with more
or less difference of language, that the approach of death produces a state of mind in which the utterances of the
dying person are to be taken as free from all ordinary motives to misstate."). But see Brian A. Liang, Shortcuts to
"Truth": The Legal Mythology of Dying Declarations, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229,237-43 (1998) (demonstrating
the practical and scientific considerations that call the dying declaration hearsay exception into question).
37. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
38. Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of
Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 511 (2005); David Stout, Justices Strengthen Right to Confront Witnesses,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004 (online edition), available at http://www.nytimes.com2004/03/08/politics/O9CND_
SCOTUS.html?ex=1394168400&en=6b58e261ab9dc9d7&ei=5007&partner-USERLAND.
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
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adequately the meaning of testimonial would cause both prosecutors and defense
attorneys a great deal of confusion in determining the scope of the Sixth Amendment. 4 Indeed, Crawford created significant bewilderment as state and federal
courts attempted to formulate new methods for discerning the revised interpretation
of the Confrontation Clause."
C. Honing "Testimonial": Davis v. Washington
Crawford controlled the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause until the
Supreme Court refined the meaning of testimonial in Davis v. Washington42 two
years later. Davis was a decision based on two consolidated cases that dealt with
statements made to police officers by victims of two separate episodes of domestic
violence.43
The first case concerned a phone conversation between a 911 operator and
Michelle McCottry. 44 During the conversation the operator discovered that
McCottry was involved in a dispute with an ex-boyfriend, Adrian Davis.4 5 McCottry
frantically stated that she was being attacked by Davis.4 6 While she was still
speaking with the operator, McCottry then reported that the attacks had stopped,
Davis had fled, and that she was no longer in immediate danger. 7 The 911 operator
gathered additional information about the incident and informed McCottry that
police officers would arrive shortly.4 8
The companion case resulted from a domestic dispute between a married couple,
Amy and Herschel Hammon.49 Police arrived after a reported domestic disturbance
to find Amy "somewhat frightened" and alone on her front porch. After brief
questioning of Amy, police officers found Herschel in the kitchen of the home.51 He
explained that the couple had engaged in an argument, but no physical altercation
took place. 2 Police officers separated the couple, inquired into the origins of the
dispute, and thereafter discovered signs of recent violence in the home. 3 Upon
further inquiry, the police officers had Amy provide an affidavit in which she stated
that Herschel broke the glass front of their furnace, shoved her into the debris, and
hit her in the chest.54
Both Adrian Davis and Herschel Hammon were tried on domestic violence
charges. In Davis's case, Washington prosecutors introduced McCottry's recorded

40. Id. at 75.
41. See Linda Greenhouse, Justicesto Decide When Victims' TranscriptsCan Be Used, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
1, 2005, at A20.
42. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
43. Id. at 817-19.
44. Id. at 817.
45. Id. at 818.
46. Id. at 817.
47. Id. at 818.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 819.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at819-20.
54. Id. at 820.
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phone call to the 911 operator as proof that he was the assailant.5 These statements
were used against Davis notwithstanding McCottry's absence at trial.16 Similarly,
in Hammon's case Indiana prosecutors introduced Amy Hammon's affidavit
without her live testimony.57 Both defendants were convicted and appealed on
Confrontation Clause grounds.58
The Supreme Court moved beyond its relatively vague explanation of the new
standard for Confrontation Clause analysis set out in Crawford and introduced a
new measure for determining when a statement is testimonial.59 Again writing for
the majority, Scalia explained:
[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They
are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicated that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.'
Under this analysis, the Court found that Michelle McCottry' s statements to the
911 operator were nontestimonial because they were uttered to understand and
extinguish a present threat of harm.6'
Part of the Court's analysis focused on the distinctions between McCottry's
statements and the recorded statements Sylvia Crawford provided to police after
Michael Crawford's arrest.62 Justice Scalia highlighted these distinctions as a
method for demonstrating the operation of the primary purpose test. 63 He first noted
that McCottry was explaining events "as they were actually happening" rather than
events that occurred in the past.' Unlike Sylvia Crawford, McCottry's statements
did not provide a later narrative account of an event that could be used to
incriminate Davis.65 Instead, McCottry's statements to the 911 operator were a
genuine call for help indicating that she was facing a current emergency.66 An
objective view of the questions and responses between the 911 operator and
McCottry revealed that the nature of the discussion was to resolve the present
emergency instead of learning what had happened in the past. In other words, the
responses were not procured to build evidence against Davis.67

55. Id. at 819. The two officers that arrived after the dispute testified at Davis's trial that McCottry appeared
to have sustained recent injuries, but neither officer could testify that Davis was the source of the injuries. Id. at
2271.
56. Id. at 2273.
57. Id. at 820-21.
58. Id. at 819, 821.
59. Id. at 822.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 828.
62. Id. at 827.
63. Id.
64. Id. (emphasis omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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Additionally, the level of formality of the interview played a part in
characterizing McCottry's statements.68 McCottry's responses to the 911 operator
were described as "frantic" and recorded during the informal process of a telephone
conversation.69 In contrast, Sylvia Crawford was interviewed in the calm setting of
a police stationhouse where officers asked calculated questions about past events.7 °
After finding that McCottry' s statements were nontestimonial, the Court shifted
its focus to the affidavit Amy Hammon provided to police officers after the
domestic dispute with Herschel Hammon. 7' The Court characterized the statement
as testimonial, noting the high resemblance to the recorded statement given by
Sylvia Crawford. 72 The Court also explained that at the time the statement was
given, there was no ongoing emergency and there was no immediate threat to
Amy. 73 Accordingly, the purpose of the affidavit could only be to provide evidence
of past events for use in later prosecution.
D. Lingering Questions after Crawford and Davis
Although the primary purpose test in Davis refined the theoretical understanding
of testimonial statements, the decision still left a fair amount of confusion for
practical application. Part of this confusion, noted in Justice Thomas's dissent, is
that it is not always clear what the primary purpose of an investigation is or if there
is a single primary purpose in making a statement.74 Thomas's criticism is rooted
in the notion that police officers often engage in interrogations both for addressing
a criminal emergency and to gather evidence for future prosecution. 5 He explained
that declaring that one purpose is primary and another secondary "requires
constructing a hierarchy of purpose that will rarely be present... [and] will
inevitably be, quite simply, an exercise in fiction. 76
Thomas further remarked that evaluating primary purpose entailed an inquiry
into whose intentions controlled the nature of a statement.77 While the intent of the
declarant may be one possible perspective, it is also possible that one should
consider the "subjective intentions of police officers" or other interrogators.78
Indeed, this consideration makes a great deal of sense given that Crawford was
meant to address the unjust inquisitorial practices by Marian justices of the peace
in sixteenth-century England.79

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
ultimately
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 829.
Id.
Id. at 829-30.
Id. at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 839-40. The majority explains that an analysis of the character of out-of-court statements should
focus on the declarant's statements, not the interrogator's questions. Id. at 822 n.1.
Id.at 839.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
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Davis also raises questions regarding the breadth of interpretation for an
"ongoing" emergency. 8" This inquiry is largely based on a declarant's proximity to
harm. 8' If one takes a narrow approach in defining emergency as a present imminent
harm, then the vast majority of out-of-court statements made to police officers will
be declared testimonial.8 2 On the other hand, if an emergency is interpreted too
broadly then the Confrontation Clause will provide almost no protection to criminal
defendants.83 Because of the nature of human trauma, these questions raise
particular concern when evaluating statements made to medical personnel. While
there may be many situations in which a doctor needs to elicit information from a
patient to address immediate trauma, many patients visit their doctors long after any
such emergency occurs.
Consider, for example, a victim of physical abuse who suffers non-lethal injuries
as a result of a single attack. Weeks later she may visit her doctor to address
lingering pain. Even if we presume that the doctor's primary purpose is to treat the
pain, the way we define "ongoing emergency" affects the nature of the patient's
statement. If one adopts a narrow definition of an emergency that only accounts for
immediate and present danger, then it is likely that all of her statements regarding
the source of the injury will be considered testimonial because there is no ongoing
emergency.84 Conversely, if one takes a broad approach in defining an ongoing
emergency that encompasses things like lingering pain, then it is likely that a
substantial portion of the victim's statements will be nontestimonial.85
Deciding whose perspective controls the confrontation analysis entails an even
more perplexing inquiry. Crawforddraws the witness's "solemn declaration" as the
baseline for determining whether a statement is testimonial.86 Davis, on the other
hand, looks to the purpose of interrogation as the determinative mark.87 This shift
in focus from the witness's declaration to the interrogator's purpose appears
inconsistent.88 Should the declarative intent of the speaker be the measure? This
inquiry would essentially ask, "did the speaker expect his statement to be used for
later prosecution?" Should the intent of the inquiring physician be the measure by
which we evaluate these statements? Should a comprehensive view of the nature of
a discussion that incorporates a totality of circumstances be the appropriate guide
in determining the character of a statement? And if so, what considerations should
be taken into account?
These are questions that various state and federal courts have struggled with in
the wake of Crawford and Davis. Because the Supreme Court has given fairly
limited direction in this area (and because that direction has come forward only in

80. See Michael H. Graham, The Davis Narrowing of Crawford: Is the PrimaryPurpose Test of Davis
JurisprudentiallySound, "Workable, " and "Predictable?",42 CR1M L. BuLL. 604, 623 (2006).
81. Andrew Dylan, Comment, Working Through the ConfrontationClause After Davis v. Washington, 76
FORDHAM L. REv. 1905, 1926-1928 (2007).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 1927.
85. See id at 1929.
86. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
87. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
88. See Graham, supra note 80, at 610.
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the context of police investigations), lower courts have been left to their own
devices in formulating confrontation doctrine. The result is that courts attempt to
analogize the primary purpose test to encompass communications made to
physicians and medical personnel. In this effort, the law with respect to the
Confrontation Clause and medical communications has developed varying ways.
The next section will address the different approaches courts have used in this area
and the difficulties each approach entails.
HI. EVALUATING PATIENT COMMUNICATIONS WITH PHYSICIANS
UNDER CRAWFORD AND DAVIS: THREE APPROACHES
After Crawford and Davis, lower courts began to see numerous Confrontation
Clause challenges based on incriminating out-of-court statements made to doctors
and nurses admitted in evidence. Under the Roberts regime a vast majority of
jurisdictions allowed such evidence89 under the "firmly rooted hearsay exception"
of statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 90 With the
overruling of Roberts, various courts began to formulate their own tests for finding
when statements are considered testimonial or nontestimonial. The goal for each of
these courts has been to transpose the evaluative processes outlined by the Supreme
Court in the context of law enforcement to the field of communications made to
doctors and medical personnel. The results are not uniform.
A survey of post-Crawfordand post-Davisdecisions reveals that state and federal
courts have created three major approaches for determining when statements are
testimonial. 9' The first approach focuses on the intent of the declarant at the time
the statement was made. The second approach focuses on the purpose sought by the
party questioning the declarant. The final approach aims to evaluate the nature of
the declarant's statement based on the totality of circumstances surrounding the
utterance. Each approach will be evaluated in turn after a brief introduction of the
paradigmatic scenarios that raise the most difficult confrontation dilemmas.
When considering the possibility that both the declarant and the questioner (or
some combination thereof) may affect a confrontation determination, it is helpful
to recognize that two scenarios raise relatively little analytical difficulty. These two
situations occur when the declarant intends to make a testimonial statement and the
questioner intends to procure one or, conversely, when the declarant does not
anticipate that his statement will be used prosecutorially and the questioner has no
intention of gathering evidence for later criminal charges.
The difficult situations arise where the declarant's and the questioner's
expectations diverge. The first difficult case occurs when the declarant intends to
accuse another of a particular act, but the questioner does not intend to use the

89. E.g., United States v. Sumner, 204 F.3d 1182, 1185 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Rule 803(4), which allows the
admission of statements made for the purposes of obtaining medical diagnosis and treatment, is widely accepted
as a firmly rooted hearsay exception.").
90. FED. R. EvtD. 803(4). The exception declares the following admissible: "[s] tatements made for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment." Id.
91. See Dylan, supra note 81, at 1918-26.
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accusation prosecutorially. The other difficult case occurs when the questioner
intends to procure a testimonial statement, but the declarant does not anticipate that
the statement will be used against any defendant. When addressing these difficult
cases courts will likely reach different results based on which of the following
analyses apply.
A. DeclarativeIntent as a Determinative Guide
In spite of Crawford's heavy emphasis on a witness's "solemn affirmation,"
relatively few courts have developed an analysis that begins with the declarant's
intent when evaluating statements made to medical personnel.92 One reason for the
reluctance is that Davis'sprimary purpose test has influenced courts to first look to
the interviewer's role before the declarant's intent.93
Professor Richard Friedman argues that the declarant's intent should always be
the controlling measure for evaluating whether a statement is testimonial or
nontestimonial.9 4 His assertion is grounded in the premise that the mere presence
of a government investigator does not affect a statement's characterization as
testimonial or nontestimonial; rather, it is the declarant's expectation in a given
context that ought to control its classification. 95 Friedman asserts that an
investigator's intent to procure evidence for trial has limited bearing on the nature
of a statement because if a declarant knowingly speaks to a police agent after the
commission of some crime, his statement will likely be testimonial simply by virtue
of his understanding of the role of law enforcement.9 6 Conversely, if he
unknowingly speaks to undercover law enforcement, his statements will likely be
nontestimonial because the context of the conversation will not lend itself to a
declarant's expectation of prosecutorial use. 97
For instance, a conspirator could not make a testimonial statement to a
coconspirator simply because a government agent was secretly listening to the
statement.98 The idea is sensible because it accounts for a declarant's expectations
given his audience. However, this approach may not provide a completely workable
match in the context of communications made to medical workers.

92. E.g., State v. Slater, 939 A.2d 1105, 1117-18 (Conn. 2008); People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82, 89 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005); State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834, 844 (Ohio 2006); State v. Brigman, 632 S.E.2d 498, 506 (N.C.
2006). This does not purport to be an exhaustive list of cases that begin Confrontation analysis with the declarant's
expectation, however, this minority view is representative based on a broad survey of post-Crawford cases in this
context. Compareinfra notes 157 and 188 (noting decisions that employ the function-of-investigator approach and
totality of circumstances approach, respectively).
93. See Graham, supra note 80, at 612.
94. Richard D. Friedman, Grapplingwith the Meaning of "Testimonial", 71 BROOK. L. REv. 241,255-259
(2005) [hereinafter Friedman, Grappling]. Although this article was written before Davis, Professor Friedman
maintains that this is the appropriate approach for characterizing out-of-court incriminating statements. Richard
Friedman, The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2008).
95. Grappling,supra note 94, at 256-57.
96. Id. at 253.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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In State v. Stahl9 a female victim reported a rape to police the day after it
occurred.' °0 After the report, an officer transported the victim to a Developing
Options for Violent Emergencies (DOVE)"° ' unit at a nearby hospital." ° Prior to
examination by a nurse for the program, the victim signed a consent form
acknowledging the voluntary nature of the examination and the authorization to
release evidence "to a law enforcement agency for use only in the investigationand
prosecution of this crime."103 During the examination the victim provided a
narrative report of the rape to the nurse that was later used against the defendant in
prosecution for rape and kidnapping."t 4 The victim did not testify nor was she
subject to prior cross-examination because she died before the defendant's trial. °5
Over the defendant's Sixth Amendment objection, the Ohio Supreme Court allowed
the victim's incriminating statements by evaluating the anticipated use of those
statements from the perspective of the declarant.'6 With this focus the court found
that the victim's statements "served a.. .distinct medical purpose" because she had
already given a testimonial account of the rape to a police officer and the redundant
subsequent account could therefore only be given for the purpose of medical
treatment.0 7 The majority addressed the matter of the consent form authorizing
release of evidence for later prosecution by stating that the "form does not refer to
statements made by a patient," but instead only to the physical evidence such as
clothing and photographs collected during the examination. 0 8 Thus, the court
parsed the examination record and asserted that the victim would reasonably believe
that physical evidence may be used to incriminate the defendant, but her statements
would only be used to render medical treatment.' 9
Certainly, there is ample room to criticize the Ohio court's approach. Many of
the statements introduced concerned facts about the incident, including a possible
motive for the assault, having little to do with the nurse's treatment." 0 The victim's
narrative not only unequivocally identified the defendant but also established the

99. 855 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio 2006).
100. Id. at 836.
101. According to its website, the DOVE Program is a clinical program specifically created for victims of
sexual and other types of abuse. The program's objectives include providing specialized "medico-legal care to
victims of sexual assault," but "[t]he DOVE Program has no affiliation with any law enforcement agency or
prosecutor's office, although collaboration may occur in the course ofproviding direct patient care." Summa Health
Systems, DOVE Program, http://www.surmmahealth.org/common/templates/contentindex.aspD=-337. (last visited
Feb. 24, 2008).
102. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d at 836.
103. Id. at 837. (emphasis added).
104. Id.

105. Id. at 838.
106. Id. at 844. The court expressed its view that "for Confrontation Clause purposes, courts should focus
on the expectation of the declarant at the time of making the statement; the intent of the questioner is relevant only
if it could affect a reasonable declarant's expectations." Under this analysis the court did not find that the DOVE
nurse had an influence on the victim's expectation that her statements would be used at trial. Id.
107. Id. at 846. If this argument is carried to its logical end, it seems that a person can no longer make a
testimonial statement after having made a statement containing the same information to police.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 837. In the account the victim explained that she went to see the defendant to attempt to persuade
him to rehire her boyfriend, and he explained that he would help them out if "[she would] do something to [him]."
Id.
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precise events of the assault. In this way, the report highly resembled the affidavit
provided by Amy Hammon.
Further criticism came from three dissenting Ohio Supreme Court Justices who
agreed with the majority insofar as the declarant's expectation should control the
characterization of her statements.1 ' The dissent disagreed, however, that the
primary purpose of the statements was for medical diagnosis or treatment. Instead
it declared that "[u]nder any objective standard, [the victim] knew her statement
could be used at [the defendant's] trial.""' 2 The dissent explained that this
knowledge was clear by virtue of the consent release authorizing prosecutorial 13use
of evidence and the answers to the DOVE nurse's questions about the event.'
The differing conclusions in Stahl underscore the difficulty that a solely
declarant-based focus raises in evaluating out-of-court incriminating statements.
First, it is evident that the dual function of the nurse as a caregiver and an
investigator muddles a clear understanding of which purpose is primary during the
course of the discussion."' Indeed, this seems to be another formulation of Justice
Thomas's criticism of the idea of singular primary purpose when evaluating the acts
of police officers. 15 Second, the dual purpose of the nurse frustrates the idea that
the victim expected her statements to achieve a single purpose. 16 A patient seeking
treatment, even knowing that she is making statements to a government investigator,
cannot both anticipate prosecutorial use and medical assessment as the overriding
function of her communication. Otherwise stated, the victim in Stahl could not
logically assert that she communicated with the DOVE nurse with the foremost
intention of receiving medical care and the foremost intention of developing
incriminating evidence." 7
Another difficulty that accompanies a declarant-based focus is evaluating
statements of child victims to physicians. 8 The main concern with child declarants
is whether they can make testimonial statements given their limited understanding
of the criminal justice system and the penal consequences their statements may
entail." 9 If children are required to have a certain understanding of criminal
prosecution to make testimonial statements, then a strictly declarant-based focus
will render statements by particularly young children per se nontestimonial simply

111. Id. at 846 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 848.
113. Id. It is interesting that in its declarant-focused analysis, the dissent consistently refers to the contextual
circumstances surrounding the interview and the effect those circumstances have on the characterization of the
victim's statements. Id. One may rightly question whether the dissent's analysis is exclusively declarant-based. See
discussion infra Part ffl.C.
114. See note 82 and accompanying text.
115. Thomas's dissent notes the difficulty in assigning primary purpose to investigating police officers and
the overlapping motives that an officer may harbor. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. One court has recognized that adults with mental retardation pose a similar problem. State v. Hosty, 944
So.2d 255 (Fla.2006). For Confrontation purposes the court analogized statements of a mentally retarded adult to
statements made by children. Id. at 260.
119. Tom Lininger, Kids Say the Darndest Things: The ProsecutorialUse of Hearsay Statements by
Children,82 IND. L.J. 999, 1001 (2007).
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by virtue of their limited legal understanding and vocabulary.' 20 One concern this
raises is a movement away from the accusatory nature inherent in testimonial
statements. Professor Friedman shares this concern, especially when considering
statements made by very young children. 12' Friedman, however, notes that the test
for determining whether a child is capable of making testimonial statements should
not rest on her understanding of criminal prosecution; rather, it should be based on
whether a child is capable of understanding that her statements will incur some
adverse consequence for another person.' 22 Leading studies in child behavioral
development provide a foundation for Friedman's theory.
In the late 1950s psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg began a series of studies on
the development of moral judgment in male children of various ages.123 Kohlberg
proposed a hypothetical scenario involving Heinz, a husband whose dying wife
requires a revolutionary drug he cannot afford. 24 Heinz is faced with the dilemma
of whether he should steal the drug to save his wife. Based on the responses,
Kohlberg devised a framework illustrating the progressive levels of moral reasoning
humans develop as they mature. 1225
Each level is broken into two sub-stages
6
representing moral understanding. 1
Kohlberg found that most children under nine-years old reason at the
Preconventional Level. 127 Preconventional reasoning begins at Stage 1 where
children base moral reasoning on a self-interested understanding of obedience and
punishment. 128 At this stage moral agents are entirely egocentric-punishment is
understood as a consequence to one's self; rules are obeyed only to avoid
punishment. 129 Kohlberg explains that children reasoning at stage 1 "[do not]
consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from the actor' s" and
that "[a]ctions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological
interests of others."' 3 °
The notion of consequential punishment for others likely begins at Stage 2 where
moral reasoning incorporates an understanding of other viewpoints, but is still
highly self-interested.' 3 ' At this stage children recognize that disobedient or

120. For the results of one study evaluating children's limited ability to define legal terms see Karen Saywitz
et al., Children's Knowledge of Legal Terminology, 14 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 523, 527-34 (1990) (discussing a
study examining "age-related patterns in communicative abilities relevant to providing testimonies, specifically,
knowledge of legal terms commonly used with children in court").
121. Grappling,supra note 94, at 272.
122. Id. at 273.
123.

LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE NATURE AND VALtDrrY OF

MORAL STAGES, at xxvii (1984).
124. Id. at 186.
125. Id. at 170-77. Kohlberg's stage theory has been applied in numerous works of legal scholarship. A
LexisNexis search including the terms "Lawrence Kohlberg" and "moral reasoning" yields over 100 results. Jurists
have applied the theory in areas varying from judicial decision-making, Michael D. Daneker, Moral Reasoning
and the Quest for Legitimacy, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 49 (1993), to legal economic analysis, Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1309, 1321
(1986).
126. KOHLBERG, supra note 123, at 173.
127. Id. at 172.
128. Id. at 174.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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unlawful action by others entails possible punishment.' This stage is still part of
the Preconventional Level because reasoning is highly individualistic and moral
agents do not yet consider themselves as members of society.'33 However, the shift
from Stage 1 moral reasoning to Stage 2 moral reasoning represents an important
development because it marks the point when a child anticipates adverse consequences for others based on his own actions.' 3 4
The following example illustrates the distinction: Kohlberg asked two subjects
whether one brother should tell his father of a sibling's misdeed, revealed in
confidence.' 35 Explaining why the brother should tell the father, the younger child
gives a Stage 1 answer: "In one way it was right to tell because his father might beat
him up. In another way it's wrong because his brother will beat him up if he
tells."' 36 Here, the contemplation of adverse consequences is purely self-referential;
the child's only concern is to avoid being "beat up."' 37 On the other hand, a child
reasoning at Stage 2 explains, "The [first] brother should not tell or he'll get his
brother in trouble. If he138wants his brother to keep quiet for him sometime, he'd
better not squeal now."'
Kohlberg notes the critical difference in the Stage 2 subject as "an extension of
concern to the brother's welfare."' 139 One author refers to this progression as the
"overcoming of egocentrism."'" This step is significant for a confrontation analysis
because it marks the point where a declarant understands that his statements can
entail detrimental impact on others. Most importantly, the Stage 2 child expresses
a new faculty absent in the Stage 1 child-the understanding of what it means to
"squeal"'' or "turn informer." 142
Kohlberg's theory is useful for confrontation purposes because it shows that at
43
a certain point children anticipate that their words can affect others unfavorably.
A child reasoning at Stage 2 may not understand the meaning of the phrase
"reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,"' but the child's understanding
captures precisely that idea. 45 The statement of the Stage 2 child wholly
incorporates the principle of accusation in the sense that there is an identification
of wrongdoing by another. This is valuable for confrontation doctrine because the
text of the Sixth Amendment accords a right to "the accused."'"
Unfortunately, Kohlberg's stages do not provide a blueprint for precisely when
a child develops the cognitive faculty to comprehend the punitive consequences of

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 182.
Id. at 174.
See id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

140. WILLIAM C. CRAIN, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 113 (1980).

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Kohlberg, supra note 123, at 182.
WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2215 (3d ed. 1981).
Kohlberg, supra note 123, at 182.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
See Grappling,supra note 94, at 273.
U.S. CONST. amend VI.
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his statements.147 There does not appear to be a uniform age for this progression,
48
and it is possible that two or more stages may be simultaneously operative.
Kohlberg's work has also faced criticism on the grounds that his progressive
theory was based entirely on responses from male subjects. 149 Professor Carol
Gilligan notes that gender differences play a key role in the moral development of
humans and illustrated this principle through a series of studies conducted in the
1970s.15 ° Using the same methods as Kohlberg with both male and female subjects,
Gilligan discovered that the development of female moral reasoning is
fundamentally different than that of males.' 5 ' She describes the development of
moral judgment in females as an "ethic of care"'52 where understanding of
interconnected relationships between people forms the foundation for moral
judgment.'53
Female responses to Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma tended to show a desire to
preserve workable relations between all parties-"if Heinz and the druggest [sic]
had talked it out long enough, they could reach something besides stealing."' 54 Male
responses, on the other hand, moved closer towards a mathematical approach based
on a calculus of harm. 155 The differences in responses showed slower progression
through Kohlberg' s moral stages for females. Gilligan advances a rationale for the
disparity: "Failing to see the dilemma as a self-contained problem in moral logic,
she does not discern the internal structure of its resolution; as she constructs
the
156
problem differently herself, Kohlberg's conception completely evades her.'
If there is such a difference between male and female moral development then
the Kohlberg's stage analysis may not be the exemplary model for Confrontation
Clause methodology. The difficult question raised by Gilligan' s critique is whether
a confrontation analysis should incorporate gender differences. Nonetheless,
Kohlberg's framework provides a useful starting point in analyzing inculpatory
statements of young children because it marks the fundamental sense of accusation
that triggers the protection of the Confrontation Clause.
An approach to Confrontation Clause analysis that focuses entirely on the
expectations of the declarant shows promising consonance with the constitutional
aim articulated in Crawford and Davis. With that in mind, such an analysis may
give rise to challenging questions, especially when considering declarations of
young children. Because of these questions, many courts have looked beyond
declarative intent in evaluating statements raising confrontation questions. The next
section will outline one such approach.

147. See KOHLBERG, supra note 123, at 171-72.
148. CRAIN, supra note 139, at 109, 112.
149.

(1982).
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

CAROL Ga.IGAN, IN ANOTHER VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WoMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 18

Id. at 1-4.
Id. at 31.
Id. at30.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 29.
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B. Intent of Interviewer as a ConstitutionalMeasure
In evaluating out-of-court statements after Crawfordand Davis, some courts have
placed heavy consideration on the function and intent of the questioning party.'5 7
It would be wrong to say that these courts entirely disregard the substance of
statements; rather, these courts place primary focus on the intent of the investigating
party. Although this shift in focus may alter how one views an adverse witness, it
is sensible given the apparent common law origins of the Sixth Amendment and the
holding in Davis.
One of the evils the Sixth Amendment sought to prevent was the Marian form of
interrogation by justices of the peace.' 5 8 That concern has been preserved for those
courts that emphasize the role that modem day interrogators play when enforcing
the protection of the Confrontation Clause. This view is also sensible after Davis
because of its specific reference to the "primary purpose of the interrogation"' 59 as
the determinative measure of whether a statement is testimonial. A review of
several court decisions shows that an approach focusing primarily on the intent of
the questioning party carries advantages as well as disadvantages.
In State v. Vaught' 6° the defendant was charged with sexual assault of a minor.
After the victim's step-mother noticed signs of abuse, the four-year old victim was
taken to the hospital for examination the day after the assault. 16' During the
162
examination the child reported what occurred and the identity of the perpetrator.
At trial the examining doctor relayed the statements of the victim and testified that
"[her] Uncle DJ put his finger in her pee-pee." 163 In determining whether the
statement was testimonial, the court explained that the victim's statements had no
resemblance to the examples of testimonial statements as described in Crawfordand
gave almost no consideration as to her communicative intent at the time the
statements were made. 64 Instead, the court focused on the fact that the doctor's
purpose during the examination was to render medical treatment and there was "no
government involvement in the initiation or course of the examination." 65The court

157. E.g., United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 896 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gardinier, 65 M.J.
60, 65 (C.A.A.F. 2007); People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 218 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 612 (2007);
Thomas v. State, 654 S.E.2d 682, 688 (Ga. App. 2007); Hernandez v. State, 946 So.2d 1270, 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2007); State v. Hooper, 176 P.3d 911, 91.7-18 (Idaho 2007); People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 364 (IlI.
2007); Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 47 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (finding that child's statements to nurse are
testimonial because interview was conducted with express purpose of developing testimony); State v. Scacchetti,
711 N.W.2d 508, 514 (Minn. 2006) ("We begin our analysis by examining the identity and purpose of the
questioner."); Foley v. State, 914 So.2d 677, 685 (Miss. 2005); State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 291 (Neb. 2004);
State v. Ortega, 2008-NMCA-001, 28,175 P.3d 929,935, cert. denied,2007-NMCERT-012, 175 P.3d 307; State
v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 563 (N.D. 2006); Commonwealth v. Garces, 82 Pa. D.& C.4th 178, 193-94 (Pa. Ct.
Com. PI. 2006).
158. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004).
159. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
160. 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004).
161. Id. at 286.
162. Id. at 289.
163. Id. at 286.
164. Id. at 289.
165. Id. at 291.
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contrasted the doctor's examination with a case where children were interviewed
with the explicit purpose of developing incriminating evidence.' 66
Other courts have reached the opposite result when the investigating nurse or
examiner is in some way connected with government investigation. 167 These courts
often emphasize the governmental function the interviewer serves when evaluating
statements made by young children. 168 This is one strategy for approaching the
difficult scenario presented when an interviewer seeks a testimonial statement, but
it is unclear whether the declarant intends to make one.
Psychological studies in forensic interviewing techniques aid in understanding
this view. These studies indicate that certain interviewing strategies can impair child
responses because of their vulnerability to suggestive questioning.' 69 Behavioral
scientists note that adults are also susceptible to suggestive interviewing, albeit at
a reduced level. 7 ' Psychologist Michael Lamb explains, "young children, especially
preschoolers, are more likely than older children both to respond erroneously to
suggestive questions about their experiences and to select erroneous options when
responding to forced-choice questions."'' Lamb further notes that open invitation
questions (e.g., "what happened?") tend to generate more forensically relevant
details than other suggestive questioning techniques. 72
' But perhaps more troubling
are child responses derived in the presence of interviewer bias. Interviewer bias
occurs where a questioner holds preconceived beliefs of past events and seeks to
elicit responses consistent with those beliefs.' 73 The phenomenon is often
distinguished by a desire only to gather evidence that confirms the truth of the
interviewer's belief through the use of specific and presumptive questioning. 174 The
result is not only a greater occurrence of false assents, 175 but also a greater number
176
of "false claims about a wide range of events."'
With these considerations in mind, it is no wonder that some courts have focused
on interviewer intent when evaluating child statements. Suggestive questioning

166. Id. at 292 (citing Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36 (Md. App 2004) (child interviewed for express purpose
of developing testimony)).
167. See, e.g., id.
168. See supra note 157.
169. Cindy L. Hardy & Sarah A. Van Leuween, Interviewing Young Children:Effects of Probe Structures
and Focus of Rapport-BuildingTalk on the Qualitiesof Young Children'sEyewitness Statements, 36 FORENSIC
PSYCH. 155, 156 (2004).
170. Maggie Bruck, Stephen J. Ceci, &Helene Hembrooke, Reliability and CredibilityofYoung Children's
Reports: From Research to Policy and Practice,53 AM. PSYCHOL. 136, 146 (1998).
171. Michael Lamb etal., Age Differences in Young Children'sResponses to Open-EndedInvitationsin the
Course of ForensicInterviews, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 926, 927 (2003).
172. Id.at931.
173. Bruck et al., supra note 170, at 140.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 143. A false assent is an affirmative response to aquestion that contains a false supposition. Such
questions may include subtle hints or suggestions. For example, the following two questions that Professor Bruck
cites from a study involving the false supposition that there is a cabinet in a room: (1) "Is there a cabinet in the
room?" (2) "Isn't there a cabinet in the room. ' Id. (internal citations omitted).
176. Id. at 144. For illustrative purposes Professor Bruck points to a series of studies in which a large group
of three- and four-year-old children participated in a medical examination in which half of the children received
a genital examination. After the examination the children responded to subsequent leading questions. A significant
proportion of children who underwent a genital exam reported inaccurate and overemphasized genital touching.
And among the children who did not undergo any genital exam, many reported genital touching. Id. at 142.
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tends to draw presumed responses from interviewees. If medical personnel have
reason to suspect abuse, then their questions may be informed by those suspicions.
If those questions naturally lead toward accusatorial responses, then finding
testimonial statements is the obvious consequence.
An increased emphasis on the interviewer's intent, however, tends to produce
strict line drawing where statements are made to medical personnel performing
investigative functions.177 This is problematic because it is just as plausible that a
child could make a nontestimonial statement to an investigating doctor as he could
to an investigating police officer.' In fact, the above studies show that a given
statement's content may have more to do with the question posed than the
questioner.Moreover, if this strict interpretation prevails, then witnesses who have
sustained episodes of abuse may be able to subvert the protection of the
Confrontation Clause by, afterward, choosing to visit doctors with no government
affiliation.'79 This could become especially prevalent in jurisdictions that consider
the relationship between medical personnel and law enforcement as an influential
factor in confrontation analysis. 80
Part of the problem with the intent-of-the-questioner approach is the way in
which "ongoing emergency" is interpreted in the context of medical trauma. In
Vaught, the victim was taken to the hospital nearly twenty-four hours after the
victim sustained the trauma that led to the visit.' 8 ' Part of the court's justification
in allowing the statement was that the doctor needed to determine the identity of the
victim's attacker to prevent subsequent harm.'82 The difficulty here is that there is
no principled reason for distinguishing physicians from police officers in this
respect. Both professions aim to protect citizens from future harm, and it would be
equally understandable that a police officer would need to know the identity of an
attacker to prevent future harm. For instance, Davis explained that the disclosure
of the defendant's identity to the 911 operator enabled dispatched officers to "know
whether they would be encountering a violent felon."' 8 3 The same rationale applies
to the physician in Vaught because that doctor needed to know the identity of the
attacker to prevent future harm to the victim even though the disclosure occurred
long after the injury.' 84

177. See Elizabeth J. Stevens, Comment, Deputy Doctors: The Medical Treatement Exception After Davis
v. Washington, 43 CAL. W. L. REV.451,453 (2007) (arguing that government-connected health care providers act
as police agents when interviewing crime victims). But see Tom Harbinson, Crawford v. Washington and Davis
v. Washington's Originalism:HistoricalArguments Showing ChildAbuse Victims' Statements to Physiciansare
NontestimonialandAdmissible asan Exception to the Confrontation Clause, 58 MERCER L. REV. 569,616 (2007)
(arguing that agency law does not support the theory that physicians can act as government agents).
178. See Grappling,supranote 94, at 260.
179. Professor Friedman explains that prosecutors could attempt to manipulate the intent-of-interviewer
approach to enhance the chances that a statement will be characterized as nontestimonial by suggesting that
witnesses visit physicians with no government affiliation. Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.
com/ (Jan. 7, 2008, 14:50 EST).
180. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 946 So.2d 1270, 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding "the nature and
extent of law enforcement involvement in the examination of the child" relevant to a Sixth Amendment
determination).
181. State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Neb. 2004).
182. Id. at 291.
183. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006).
184. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d at 291. The reasoning behind this theory is that knowing the identity of the
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Another concern this approach raises is whether it is harmonious with the
command in Davis that "it is in the final analysis the declarant' s statements, not the
interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires lower courts to
evaluate."' 85 After all, Crawfordreminds lower courts that the Confrontation Clause
"applies to 'witnesses' against the accused,"'' 86 i.e., he who makes the accusation.
With this in mind, a physician's intent to create testimonial statements "cannot
make [them] so."',7 This result is sensible because it upholds the idea that a criminal
defendant has a right to confront the person who makes an incriminating remark,
not the person who solicits such a remark.
The doctrinal conflict that a purely interviewer-based approach produces
suggests that its limited analysis will prove insufficient to address all Confrontation
Clause questions. Because an interviewer's intent does not adequately capture the
notion of a witness's testimony as advanced in Crawford,the approach is vulnerable
to overbroad application in situations where a victim does not intend to make a
testimonial statement, but a medical professional seeks to produce incriminating
evidence. Therefore, to make competent confrontation assessments courts will need
to look beyond the questioner's intent when determining whether or not a statement
is testimonial. The next section examines one method of doing so.
C. The "Totality of Circumstances"Approach
A number of courts have adopted a more expansive approach to characterizing
statements made to doctors and medical personnel. 88 For these courts the intent of
no single party is dispositive of whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial. Instead, analysis proceeds with a view of the numerous circumstances
surrounding the utterance of a statement, including the declarant' s intent and the
function of the interviewer.
The court in Commonwealth v. DeOliveira189 used this approach in evaluating
statements made by a six-year-old victim of sexual abuse to a pediatrician. 9 There,
a social worker was called to investigate an allegation of domestic abuse.1 9' After
the social worker spoke with the victim she decided there were sufficient
indications of sexual abuse to contact local police immediately. 192 When police
arrived, the victim and her mother were transported to a hospital for examination.' 93
The examining doctor, a specialist in pediatric emergency medicine, was aware that

perpetrator is crucial for the treatment purpose of removing the patient from danger posed by a cohabitant. See, e.g.,
State v. Perez, 151 P.3d 249, 254 (Wash. App. 2007).
185. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 n.l.
186. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
187. Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 n.6.
188. E.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916,924-25 (Colo. 2006) (en banc); State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506,527
(Conn. 2006); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218,222-25 (Mass. 2006); State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d
636, 641 (Minn. 2007), cert. denied,128 S.Ct. 1223 (2008); State v. Romero, 2007-NMSC-013, 71 12-18, 156
P.3d 694,698-99; State v. Muttart, 875 N.E.2d 944, 955 (Ohio 2007); State v. Moses, 119 P.3d 906,912 (Wash.
App. 2005).
189.
190.
191.
192.

849 N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 2006).
Id. at 225.
Id. at 222.
Id.

193. Id.
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he would examine the child for signs of sexual abuse and that he could be
summonsed to testify about the examination in a subsequent criminal trial. 94
' During
the examination the physician asked the victim what happened to her.'95 She
responded that the defendant "put his penis... here, here, and here" while
respectively motioning toward her mouth, vagina, and rectum.'9 6 The question for
the Supreme97Judicial Court of Massachusetts was whether that statement was
testimonial. 1
The court first looked to the purpose of the interviewing physician.' 98 The court
noted that "although police officers were present at the hospital... [n]othing in the
record would support that the doctor acted as an agent of law enforcement."' 99 Next,
the court evaluated the intent of the child to determine whether "a reasonable person
in the declarant's position would anticipate the statement being used against the
accused in investigating and prosecuting a crime. ' 2°
Under this view, the court found that a child in the victim's situation would have
reasonably understood the questions as designed for medical purposes rather than for
later prosecutorial purposes.2 °' The court further emphasized that there was nothing
in the record to support the notion that the victim recognized the defendant's acts as
criminal or bad acts, and nothing in the record that suggested that the doctor was
acting as an agent of law enforcement. 2 ' Based on all of the above circumstances, the
court found that the child's statement was nontestimonial.2 °3
While DeOliveria's Confrontation Clause analysis provides a more
comprehensive understanding of the ways in which a statement may be testimonial,
there are drawbacks to consider. First, there is a danger that courts will begin to
incorporate a host of considerations in making confrontation determinations. For
example, a court could develop a confrontation analysis that focuses on the
declarant's intent, then on the intent of the interviewer, and then on the level of
relatedness between the interviewer and law enforcement.2' The eventual result
would be an extensive multifactor test for deciding when a statement is testimonial
that is inconsistent with the abandonment of the Roberts multifactor reliability
test. 20 5 Functionally, this approach would merely replace one multifactor test for
another.2 6 The harm associated with this approach is that it lends itself to the same
vulnerability identified in Roberts. When faced with a variety of factors, judges

194. Id. at 222-23.
195. Id. at 223.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 220.
198. Id. at 225.
199. Id.
200. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
201. Id. at 225-26.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Minn. 2006) (outlining an eight factor analysis in
making a determination of whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial); Hernandez v. State, 946 So.2d
1270, 1280 (Ct. App. Fl. 2007) (four factor analysis).
205. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
206. Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Providea Stable Foundationfor ConfrontationDoctrine?,71 BROoK.
L. REV. 35, 70 (2005).
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independently choose the relative importance of each, inevitably leading to
inconsistent results. Ultimately, no single guiding principle prevails.
On the other hand, it is possible that the totality of circumstances approach is
merely a declarant-based analysis masquerading under another title. One way to
formulate this hypothesis is to begin, as some courts do, with a focus on the intent
and anticipation of the declarant.2" 7 All other considerations, including the
interviewer's function, only provide support (or lack thereof) for the notion that the
speaker is making a testimonial statement. In this way, an interviewer's purpose
afact that affects
would no more represent a separate factor to analyze than simply
2 8
the reasonable declarant's understanding of her statement.
Applied to the facts of DeOliveira this articulation becomes clear. There, the
court focused on both the victim's intent and the purpose of the doctor to find that
the victim's statements were nontestimonial. However, the court could have reached
the same result by beginning its analysis with a focus on the expectations of the
child declarant. That the physician did not intend to develop the evidence against
the perpetrator would buttress a finding that the victim did not expect her statements
to be used in government prosecution.
An approach to Confrontation Clause analysis that incorporates the intent of
more than one party appears to be a comprehensive solution in determining how a
statement is characterized. However, this approach may ultimately be classified as
a declarant-based interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. This formulation is useful
in advancing a new approach that New Mexico courts should adopt when applying
the Sixth Amendment.
IV. STATE V. ROMERO AND STATE V. ORTEGA: NEW MEXICO'S
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE APPROACH TO MEDICAL
COMMUNICATIONS
State v. Romero is the only case addressing post-Crawfordconfrontation issues
in the area of medical communications to reach the New Mexico Supreme Court.
There are two opinions in the New Mexico appellate courts addressing the
confrontation issue in Romero. The first is a decision from the New Mexico Court
of Appeals [hereinafter Romero 1].29 That holding was appealed and later affirmed
by the New Mexico Supreme Court [hereinafter Romero I1].2'° The only other New
Mexico case addressing statements made to medical personnel is State v. Ortega,2 1
heard in the Court of Appeals. This series of decisions shows that New Mexico
Courts have also struggled to formulate a coherent analysis when evaluating
statements made to medical personnel. This section will address each of those
decisions in turn.

207. See supraPart Ill.A.
208. See Jerome C. Latimer, Confrontation After Crawford: The Decision's Impact on How Hearsay Is
Analyzed Under the ConfrontationClause, 36 SETON HALL L. REv. 327, 409-11 (2006). This reasoning follows
the approach outlined by Professor Friedman in that it incorporates context in determining declarant intent.
Grappling, supra note 94, at 256-57.
209. 2006-NMCA-045, 133 P.3d 842 (2006), afd,2007-NMSC-013, 156 P.3d 694 (2007).
210. 2007-NMSC-013, 156 P.3d 694 (2007).
211. 2008-NMCA-001, 175 P.3d 929, cert. denied, 2007-NMCERT-012, 175 P.3d 307.
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A. Romero I
Romero I resulted from a defendant's appeal from convictions of aggravated
battery and assault against a household member.212 In early October of 2001,
Anthony Romero called his estranged wife Jessica Romero de Herrera expressing
his desire to reunite their marriage and threatening to commit suicide if she did not
comply. 213 Sometime during the late hours of October 12th or the very early
morning of October 13th Anthony found Jessica and took her back to his mother's
house.21 4 There Anthony began choking Jessica on a bed saying that "if he couldn't
have [her]...nobody could. '215 Jessica woke up on the 13th not knowing whether
she had passed out the night before.2 16 Later, Jessica was able to call her roommate
for help. The roommate then called police to investigate. 2 7 When police arrived
Anthony forced Jessica into a bathroom, held her at knifepoint, and told her to be
quiet.2 1 The police left, only to return later that day.21 9 When they returned,
Anthony released Jessica and commanded her to tell police and others that the
marks on her neck were from rough sex.220 Jessica met police in the front of the
house, but Anthony was apparently able to escape through the back door.22'
Jessica explained to the responding officer what happened during the previous
night and during the first police dispatch.222 Nearly three weeks later, Jessica called
the officer and alleged that Anthony raped her sometime during the incident on the
12th or 13th of October.223 Jessica had not previously mentioned any episode of
sexual abuse.224 Upon hearing this allegation the officer arranged for the victim to
meet with a Sexual Abuse Nurse Examiner (SANE) 225 practitioner on November 8th

for an examination and interview. 226 During the examination Jessica reiterated what
happened nearly a month earlier and further stated that she was raped by

212. Romero I, 2006-NMCA-045,
213. Id. 1 3, 133 P.3d at 846.

2, 133 P.3d at 846.

214. Id.
215. Id.

216. Id.
217. Id.1 4, 133 P.3d at 847.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.1 5, 133 P.3d at 847.
223. Id. 6, 133 P.3d at 847.
224. Id.
225. The primary objective of SANE practitioners is to "provide objective forensic evaluation of victims of
sexual assault." A SANE practitioner's first order of procedure is to assess any need for emergency medical
treatment. After the practitioner determines that immediate medical care is not required, he or she begins an
"evidentiary examination" of the patient-victim. SANE practitioners may "release evidence to law enforcement
agencies only with the victim's consent in cases where the victim has agreed to report or has already reported the
crime," but are required to report cases of sexual assault of vulnerable adults or minor victims to appropriate
authorities. KRISTEN LxrrEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT NURSE EXAMINER (SANE) PROGRAMS:
IMPROVING THE COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULT VicriMs (2001), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/

publications/bulletins/sane_- 4_-2001/welcome.html (follow "Program Operation" hyperlink).
226. Romero I, 2006-NMCA-045, 16, 133 P.3d at 847.
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Anthony.227 Roughly two months after the interview Jessica was found dead in
Anthony's bed.228
At Anthony Romero's subsequent prosecution the trial court allowed all of
Jessica's statements made to the SANE nurse under the then-controlling Roberts
regime. 229 Romero was found guilty on assault, battery, false imprisonment, and
witness intimidation charges. 230 He appealed the convictions on confrontation
grounds after Crawford.2 3' In finding that Jessica's statements to the SANE
Court of Appeals relied on multiple
practitioner should not have been admitted, the
232
considerations surrounding those statements.
First, the examination was set up by a police officer.233 This fact, coupled with
the victim's prior accusatory statements to police, tended to show that a "person in
[her] position would likely have recognized that her statements could later be used
prosecutorially., 234 The court substantiated this conclusion by noting the extensive
period of time that elapsed between the examination and the incident.23 5 It further
reasoned that the results of the examination showed that the victim was "not
primarily concerned with getting treatment" because the victim's 236statements
reiterated the entire incident with Romero, not just the sexual assault.
The function of the SANE practitioner provided additional support for
concluding the victim's statements were testimonial.237 Citing Hammon v. State2 3 8

(before it reached the U.S. Supreme Court) the court emphasized that a statement
is testimonial if it is "given or taken in significant part for future use in legal
proceedings. 239 It then explained that the motive of an interviewer is relevant
because (1) it "bears on the intent and understanding of the declarant," and (2) "[i]f
the listener is motivated by a desire to gather evidence, he or she will be more likely
to elicit responses that will be useful in a later prosecution, thereby implicating the
concerns of Crawford."2' Ultimately, the statements were testimonial based on the
apparent expectations of the declarant, the circumstances of the interview, and the
"
'
qualifications of the SANE examiner.24
The State appealed Romero I on grounds separate from the Confrontation Clause
issue and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in April of 2006.242 By that time the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Davis. Thus, the admissibility of the victim's

227. Id.
228. Id. 2, 133 P.3d at 846. Romero was charged with second degree murder of his wife in a separate
proceeding. His trial court conviction was overturned based on an error injury instructions. State v. Romero, 2005NMCA-060, 112 P.3d 1113, cert. granted, 2005-NMCERT-005, 113 P.3d 346.
229. Romero 1,2006-NMCA-045, 1 11, 133 P.3d at 848.
230. Id. 1 2, 133 P.3d at 846.
231. Id. 11, 133 P.3d at 848.
232. Id. 53, 133 P.3d at 858.
233. Id.
234. Id. 46, 133 P.3d at 856.
235. Id. 1 53, 133 P.3d at 858.
236. Id. 1 59, 133 P.3d at 859.
237. Id. 1 60, 133 P.3d at 859.
238. 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.2005), affd sub. nom. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
239. Romero 1, 2006-NMCA-045, 60, 133 P.3d at 859 (internal quotations omitted).
240. lId
241. Id. 61, 133 P.3d at 860.
242. State v. Romero, 2006-NMCERT-004, 134 P.3d 120.
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statements to the SANE practitioner was reconsidered in light of Davis in the New
Mexico Supreme Court.243
B. Romero 11
In Romero l the defendant advanced three arguments in support of his claim that
the victim's statements to the SANE practitioner were testimonial: (1) "the
statement was the product of an investigation by authorities," (2) "the victim
subjectively knew her statement was testimonial in nature," and (3) "a reasonable
person would have objectively understood [the statements] to be testimonial." 2 "
The Court agreed that the statements were testimonial, but the vast majority of its
reasoning focused on the content of the victim's statements, rather than the SANE
practitioner's investigative role.245 Conceding that some of the victim's statements
could have been used for securing medical treatment, the Court explained that the
statements accused the defendant of specific criminal acts.246 It also noted the
significant temporal gap between the date of the incident and the meeting with the
SANE practitioner. 247 These findings provided the thrust for concluding that
Jessica's statements were testimonial. 248
C. Ortega
State v. Ortega,2 49 New Mexico's most recent case involving statements made to
medical personnel, represents a marked analytical shift away from Romero I and
Romero II. The facts are similar to Romero with one key difference: the victim was
an eight-year-old child.25°
In that case, the child disclosed that her mother's boyfriend molested her and two
days later the mother took the child to a hospital.25 ' The child was examined by a
medical professional who collected physical evidence for forensic examination, but
did not question her.252 Four days later the child was examined by a SANE
practitioner who conducted an interview.253 When the SANE practitioner asked the
child why she was there, the child responded with a "spontaneous" disclosure of the
molestation. 254 The court characterized the disclosure as a description of the times
and places where the episodes of abuse happened and also mentioned that the victim
stated that the defendant told her not to tell anyone about the incidents to spare him
from "big trouble. 255

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Romero II, 2007-NMSC-013, 156 P.3d 694.
Id. 12, 156 P.3d at 698.
Id. - 15-17, 156 P.3d at 698-99.
Id. 1 15, 156 P.3d at 698.
Id. 17, 133 P.3d at 699.
Id.
2008-NMCA-001, 175 P.3d 929, cert. denied, 2007-NMCERT-012, 175 P.3d 307.
Id. 1 2, 175 P.3d at 930.
Id.
Id. 1 3, 175 P.3d at 930.
Id. 4, 175 P.3d at 930.
Id. 5, 175 P.3d at 930-31.
Id. 24, 175 P.3d at 934-35.
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The court found that the child's statements were testimonial,256 but only through
a modified analytical approach. Instead of scrutinizing the content of the declarant's
statements as in Romero II, Ortega focused almost exclusively on the SANE
practitioner's purpose in conducting the interview.25 7 The court noted that the
primary purpose of the interview was to "gather[] evidence,"25 and also described
the interview from the perspective of the SANE practitioner by defining the
"purpose of the interrogation" as "the process of asking questions designed to elicit
an answer useful for an ascertainable purpose."25' 9
D. Shifting Analyses in New Mexico's ConfrontationDoctrine
Romero i and Ortega both incorporate an objective approach when making
confrontation determinations, but also show analytical gaps that leave an incomplete
confrontation analysis. Romero H focuses almost entirely on the declarant's
statements whereas Ortega focuses almost completely on the nature of the
interview. Compared against each other, the cases show two separate analyses for
achieving a single result.
The Ortega approach is questionable because it signals a departure from the
declarant-based approach developed in Romero II. Where Romero II maintained
focus on the accusatory nature of the victim's statements, Ortega proceeded with
a focus on the interviewer's purpose.
Ortega follows an analytical path that many other jurisdictions use when
evaluating statements of young children. 2" Uneasy with analyzing the declarative
intent of especially young victims, these courts quickly move to the purpose of the
interviewer to determine whether statements are testimonial. 261 The central failing
of this approach is that it is unfaithful to Crawford's emphasis on the witness who
makes the accusation and remains vulnerable to overbroad application when there
is no indication that a declarant intends to accuse.262
While Ortega focuses almost exclusively on the purpose of the interview,
Romero I' s focus rests at the opposite end of the confrontation spectrum by relying
exclusively on declarative intent. Under this approach, there is no mention of the
SANE practitioner's purpose in interviewing the victim or how that purpose may
have affected the declarant's utterance.2 63 Instead, the court's holding is premised
on the victim's specific accusations of the defendant's violence.2 6 In this case, such
accusations are a strong indicator of testimonial speech, but a one-sided approach
will prove more difficult when the content of a declarant's statement is not quite so
definite.
Using two separate analytical models for victims of different ages is neither
workable nor consistent with the propositions of Crawford and Davis. The first
256. Id. 1 36, 175 P.3d at 937.
257. Id. 1 29, 175 P.3d at 935-36.
258. Id. 26, 175 P.3d at 935.

259. Id. T 29, 175 P.3d at 936 (emphasis added).
260. See supra Part ILB.
261. See supra Part H.B.

262. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
263.

Romero II, 2007-NMSC-013,1

264. Id.

12-18, 133 P.3d 694, 697-99.
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problem that separate analyses raise is determining when to begin a declarant-based
inquiry given a victim's age. Courts are reluctant to evaluate the communicative
intent of child statements,265 but even more reluctant to proclaim when a child
reaches an age where he is able to anticipate the use of his statements for future
criminal litigation.26
Moreover, multiple analytical approaches subvert the procedural guarantee of
Crawfordand Davis because a varied focus retains the potential to mischaracterize
testimonial statements. That is to say, an emphatic focus on interviewer intent may
neglect accusatory declarations. Conversely, a heavy focus on declarative substance
neglects the influence of contextual phenomena such as interviewer bias.267
In light of the above-mentioned pitfalls associated with these one-sided
evaluations, New Mexico courts should adopt a consistent confrontation doctrine
with respect to statements made to medical personnel. The next section proposes an
approach to confrontation analysis that is both consonant with the propositions of
Crawfordand Davis and accounts for the difficulties that different sets of victims
present.
E. A Proposed Uniform Approach to Confrontation Clause Analysis in New
Mexico
New Mexico's varied approach in post-Crawford confrontation analysis with
respect to medical caregivers requires a stable solution. This section argues for one
such analytical process that begins with a focus on declarant intent. Before offering
this new approach, however, it is important to keep in mind the lessons of Crawford
and Davis that have contributed to lower court disparity. Of course, those lessons
must be understood against the backdrop of longstanding Sixth Amendment values.
Those issues will be discussed first to better inform a stable confrontation doctrine.
The struggle to develop a comprehensive confrontation standard stems from the
variety of analytical tools the Supreme Court delivered in Crawford and Davis.
Other sections of this article refer to the limited guidance of those decisions, 268 but
one reason the lower courts diverge significantly in doctrinal approach comes from
the many resources Crawford and Davis delivered.269 Crawford sets the starting
point for deciding which statements are testimonial with a single definition-"[a]
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact."27 The definition is based on the perspective of the witness-declarant,
he that "bear[s] testimony" or the "accuser who makes a formal statement. '"27
At the same time Crawfordreminds lower courts of the prosecutorial abuses of
Marian justices of the peace and the risks of evidence procured in ex parte

265. See supraPart 1I.B.
266. As of the time of this writing, no state or federal court has announced an age at which child declarants
are able to recognize the prosecutorial implications of their statements.
267. See supraPart IH.
268. See supraPart I.
269. Brooks Holland, What Makes Testimony...Testimonial?, 78 BROOK. L. REv 281, 281 (2005).
270. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
271. Id.; see also Grappling,supra note 94, at 246 ("If a statement is testimonial, then the maker has acted
as a witness, and so the statement is within the purview of the Confrontation Clause.").
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proceedings.272 These practices move the point of focus away from the declarant and
toward the intent of those performing investigative roles. Finally, Davis instructs
the courts to look to the primary purpose of an investigation to determine whether
a statement is testimonial.273 With this array of guidance it is no wonder that courts
have developed multiple tests for making difficult Confrontation Clause decisions
when evaluating statements made to doctors and medical personnel. However, the
variety of approaches does not mean that a single approach cannot incorporate both
the declarant-based core of Crawford and the purpose-based analysis of Davis.
Along with the diagnostic tools of Crawford and Davis, it is crucial to keep in
mind the ultimate value the Confrontation Clause serves: reliability. 274 As one
author notes, the right is "not designed to 'coddle' criminals; it is designed to ensure
that those who must decide the disputed factual issues will arrive at a correct
decision., 275 Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause acts as a mechanism to allow
a jury to get as close to the truth as possible by testing the veracity of an
incriminating remark.
When a declarant states an accusation, the defendant has the constitutional right
to test the credibility of that statement through cross-examination. When moving
towards a workable confrontation approach the goal must be to identify accusatory
statements so their reliability may be assessed by a fact-finding body.
While still holding closely to the above-mentioned values, an effective way to
reconcile the central commands of Crawford and Davis is to employ a
comprehensive analysis that maintains a focus on the declarant's intent as it relates
to the purpose of the investigation. 276 This approach first looks to the content of the
to see if they objectively bear the hallmarks of
declarant's 'statements
"solemn[ity] '277 that designate testimonial speech. That is to say, courts should look
to whether the declarant's statement appears to earnestly affirm or prove a past fact
that could be used against a defendant. The core of this stage of analysis is
concerned with accusatorial speech and recognizes that even young children have
the capacity to denounce the acts of others. 278 The analysis would then incorporate
the medical caregiver' s purpose in communicating with the witness. In this stage of
analysis courts should evaluate how an investigator's questions affect the
declarant's response.
In line with the reasoning in Romero 1,279 This shift incorporates the purposebased analysis outlined in Davis and takes into consideration the effect that a

272. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
273. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821-22 (2006).
274. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
275. Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation:Its History and Modem Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 381
(1959).
276. Latimer, supra note 208, advances a similar two stage approach, but suggests that consideration of
surrounding circumstances is relevant insofar as it affects a declarant's expectation that his statement will be used
in subsequent criminal proceedings. Id. at 410-11; see also United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir.
2004) ("The proper inquiry. ..is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the accused. That intent,
in turn, may be determined by querying whether a reasonable person in the declarant's position would anticipate
his statement being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime.")
277. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
278. See supra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 232-241 and accompanying text.
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particular interrogation has on the expectations of a reasonable declarant. This stage
of analysis is premised on the idea that a declarant's statements are affected by his
audience 28" and are not analyzed in a vacuum. Context plays a large part in making
the testimonial determination because the content of any statement is influenced by
the circumstances which surround the utterance.28 '
For instance, a reasonable declarant' s knowledge of investigating police officers
will lead him to believe that structured questions about past criminal events may be
used to develop a record for later prosecution. This may be especially relevant in
a situation where an investigating medic has already formed a belief of the
occurrence of some abuse. In these situations interviewer bias can increase the
likelihood that a declarant' s statements will affirm the belief.2 8 2 On the other hand,
the same statements to a curious friend entail a different expectation because the
declarant does not anticipate that the friend will use the statements adversely against
the person to whom he refers and, depending on circumstance,
the friend may not
2 83
have previously formulated a belief about the event.
This mode of analysis addresses the difficulty presented by medical personnel
who serve the dual purposes of medical treatment and evidence collection.
Beginning with the content of the declarant's statements reveals whether he "bear[s]
testimony" in the sense that he affirms a prior incriminating fact about the
defendant. 2" If the substance of a statement made to a medical caregiver appears to
accuse or impose blame, rather than aid in diagnosis or treatment, then the next step
in analysis is to see how the nature of the interview contributes to an expectation
that the statement could be used adversely against the defendant.
This stage of the inquiry essentially asks, "did the caregiver ask the question with
the intent of gathering evidence of a past fact?" Questions intended to establish
some prior fact, in turn, affect the reasonable declarant's expectation of how his
response will be used. Again, understanding that suggestive questions and settings
influence a declarant's statement provides the foundation for this stage of
scrutiny.285 In this way, the analysis accounts for the relationship between declarant
and interviewer, but does so with a watchful eye on the declarant's response given
the purpose of the interrogation.
Child victims will likely continue to pose difficulty in this area, but confrontation
analysis should proceed in the same manner. The substance of a child's statements
should be the starting point for any confrontation analysis. Courts should recognize
that although young children may not comprehend the nuances of criminal
prosecution, they often do understand that their statements can adversely affect
others.286 Thus, when a child reiterates that a defendant told her not to recount an
'
incident of sexual abuse because he would consequently be in "big trouble,"2 87

280.
testimony
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See Crawford, 541 U.S at 51 ("An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.").
See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 170-176 and accompanying text.
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
Id.
See generally Bruck et al., supra note 170.
See supra notes 141-145 and accompanying text.
See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
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courts should consider the developmental maturation that attends making a
statement that will get another person in trouble.
That maturation, along with the content of the statement, should be the basis for
the child's capacity for testimonial speech because it underlies the principle of
accusation that the confrontation right is designed to address.288 The important
consideration should be whether a child understands the detrimental impact of his
statement on another, and how that understanding informs the jury about the
declarant's intent in making the statement. When a child's statements suggest that
he is unaware that another person committed a bad act and should be punished for
that act, then courts should be wary of finding intent to impose blame. Conversely,
when a child identifies behavior that he considers bad or wrong then courts should
note the higher likelihood that he is making an accusation.
The inquiry should then move to evaluate the circumstances that surround the
statement. In this process courts should recognize that young children are
particularly susceptible to suggestive questioning. These considerations, when
coupled with an evaluation of a declarant' s intent, will provide a more robust view
of the statement and a better position from which to make confrontation
determinations.
The advantage to this uniform approach is that it incorporates a comprehensive
view of circumstances that a solely purpose-based inquiry neglects. This approach
also provides a single model of analysis for victims of varying ages and mental
capacities. While this proposed method will not be completely free from difficulty
in application, it will hold true to the central tenets of Crawford, Davis and the
Sixth Amendment. It will also provide useful guidance in the difficult situations
where the intentions of the declarant and the intentions of the interviewer diverge
in the creation of potentially incriminating statements. That is, a comprehensive
multi-step inquiry will better assess declarative intent based on an analysis of the
circumstances that influence declaration.
Moreover, this approach recognizes that medical personnel do not operate to
produce testimonial statements. The work of medical professionals is vital to
society. And although doctors and nurses are required to report patient abuse, the
assumption that medical professionals are obliged to provide evidence against
criminal defendants, in many ways, denigrates the practice of medicine.
Additionally, the ethical duties imposed on these professionals may compel
testimony that is supportive of criminal defendants in situations where there are
false accusations of criminal conduct.289 These considerations underscore the fact
that doctors and nurses seek to help, not to condemn. When discussing the role of
doctors and nurses in the criminal justice system this maxim should consistently
inform the development of confrontation doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Crawford marked a groundbreaking change in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and, consequently, has spawned a considerable amount of uncertainty. As

288. See supra Part II.C. F
289. See supra note 4.
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state and federal courts attempt to come to terms with the meaning of "testimonial"
under Crawford and Davis, the lower courts have advanced disparate approaches.
Even in the relatively narrow area of statements made to doctors and medical
personnel, a survey of decisions shows multiple interpretations of the Sixth
Amendment. Those interpretations have been shaped not only by Supreme Court
precedent, but also by the way we understand patient characteristics, the role of
doctors and nurses, and individual motivations. With these considerations in mind,
it is crucial to formulate workable confrontation doctrine when assessing statements
made to medical professionals.
To hold true to the values of the Confrontation Clause, that analysis must focus
on the accuser's statements as they relate to the environment in which they were
uttered. This not only ensures that accusatory statements do not escape the scrutiny
of cross-examination, but also recognizes that doctors and nurses act to prevent
harm rather than to develop evidence.
Lastly, we must keep in mind the significant consequences at stake every time
a judge makes a confrontation determination. When we consider that the liberty of
the defendant may rest on the surrogate testimony of a medical professional, the law
should regard the matter with the most rigorous observance. To best further just
results for defendants, as well as for victims of violent crimes, that observance
should recognize both the intent of the declarant and the circumstances that
influence the content of the declarant' s statement.

